DWill wrote:"you're one,too."

DWill, I finally got around to reading most of Ehrman's book, and the only way I could explain it after his good earlier research on fraud and corruption in the early church was to say he had a brain snap, a conversion event, in which his emotional bonds to Lord Jesus overwhelmed his critical faculties.

Ehrman is deeply confused, presenting arguments that rely on quasi-supernatural assumptions while claiming to salvage some scholarly credibility by denying that he is a True Believer.

DWill wrote:being emotion-driven isn't exclusive to the religious.

Allowing emotion to take priority over reason is a main indicator of religious thinking, in which blind faith is seen as more important than evidence.

There is also religious thinking among people who claim to disavow religion, for example with atheists who get highly emotional about the errors of faith, to the point that they cannot see the symbolic meaning hidden beneath the surface fantasy.

Robert Tulip wrote: Allowing emotion to take priority over reason is a main indicator of religious thinking, in which blind faith is seen as more important than evidence.

There is also religious thinking among people who claim to disavow religion, for example with atheists who get highly emotional about the errors of faith, to the point that they cannot see the symbolic meaning hidden beneath the surface fantasy.

Yeah, but this simply makes the point that any argument can influenced by what the arguer is attached to. As you've just said, the religious have no monopoly on this. I hope you don't mind my asking you: do you think your own arguments are uninfluenced by emotional attachments? Could one even make an argument in the absence of emotion?

DWill wrote:any argument can be influenced by what the arguer is attached to.

There is a need here to understand the logical distinction between facts and values. Facts are objective statements about the world, while values are expressions of moral sentiment. An argument about facts can be resolved by recourse to evidence, whereas an argument about values relies on moral persuasion. The values of a scientists do influence perceptions about which facts are important and useful, but such values should not influence scientific opinion regarding the truth of those facts.

People try to dress up values as facts to win arguments. For example instead of saying "you should believe this in order to display good values" they say "this is objectively true". Facts are more logically compelling than values, but ultimately our main decisions are about values. I think it is possible for values to be based on facts, in conjunction with explicit ultimate moral axioms.

do you think your own arguments are uninfluenced by emotional attachments?

Argument is primarily about values, with facts only used to support value statements. A value can appear good and correct to its holder either because it seems to synthesise the lessons of many facts or because it represents an authoritative statement that they trust.

But if an untrue claim has somehow wangled its way in to be perceived as fact, values can go skewiff. I think that is why Interbane put such emphasis on the detection of bias. I agree with him on this, and think one of the most interesting areas of conversation is in working through people's assumptions. All argument is affected by attachment, but commitments can be made explicit.

Could one even make an argument in the absence of emotion?

It wouldn't be much of an argument if there was no emotion. Debates about facts can mostly be resolved by objective research. It is only when we dispute which facts are important, and what the implications of partial facts might be, that we get into real argument. This requires assessments of values, and extrapolation from partial information, both of which are intrinsically emotional.

There is debate about whether policy can be based on evidence. This would mean proving that our values are based on facts. Some idealists have argued for this, but realistically, policy values can only be informed by factual evidence, not determined by it. The facts always have to be placed in a moral framework of the values we consider important.

Value judgments and preferences are intrinsically metaphysical, meaning they cannot be based solely on physical information. All statements of rights and principles ultimately rest on such metaphysical preferences - on moral sentiment, not on facts. This all left the positivist philosopher David Hume in something of a nihilist quandary, as his logical argument that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is' left him with no objectively reliable values. Immanuel Kant claimed to have refuted Hume's so-called naturalistic fallacy by arguing that support for duty is a necessary condition of experience, and so moral law has factual status. Logically, Hume cannot be refuted, but practically we cannot live without such a Kantian synthesis.

Surprising how similar topics come up in Moby Dick.

There is a need here to understand the logical distinction between facts and values. Facts are objective statements about the world, while values are expressions of moral sentiment. An argument about facts can be resolved by recourse to evidence, whereas an argument about values relies on moral persuasion. The values of a scientists do influence perceptions about which facts are important and useful, but such values should not influence scientific opinion regarding the truth of those facts.

If only argument could be resolved so easily by establishment of facts. If I say I found a blacksnake dead on the road that measured seven feet, you still might doubt me from what you think you know of blacksnakes. You'd want to make the measurement yourself. We rarely can get this kind of confirmation in reality. Trust is very important when it comes to fact. and it's easy to see that we're going to distrust 'facts' that work against our beliefs. No doubt we have a sense that it can be important to our survival to verify in person, and if we can't, we're loathe to accept anyone's word.

Argument is primarily about values, with facts only used to support value statements. A value can appear good and correct to its holder either because it seems to synthesise the lessons of many facts or because it represents an authoritative statement that they trust.

Yes, if an argument is really about a single fact, we're likely to say that the matter can settled easily and find out the answer. If it's about a bunch of facts, different story, and if it's about how we weigh, i.e., value, facts, still a more difficult job. The 'fact' is that there will almost always be more than one valid way to weigh or value facts. If it's a fact that certain inhabited islands will disappear before long, whether one favors massive world action to prevent such a happening may depend on whether one lives on an island or a continent. Self-interest and past experience may dictate.

But if an untrue claim has somehow wangled its way in to be perceived as fact, values can go skewiff. I think that is why Interbane put such emphasis on the detection of bias. I agree with him on this, and think one of the most interesting areas of conversation is in working through people's assumptions. All argument is affected by attachment, but commitments can be made explicit.

I don't know about the relationship between healthy facts and healthy values. Plenty of believers hold to things I think are counter-factual, yet their values are often not objectionable and even admirable. Basing values on facts can be a bad thing. Eugenicists thought they were doing this when they advocated for, and sometimes succeeded in, weeding out mental defectives from the breeding population.

Commitment can in theory be made explicit, but if this happened very often, argument would decrease by at least half. What would be the point if both sides admitted that they have a stake in maintaining a position? It's an agree-to-disagree. Usually, each side sees its commitment as being to the facts, and the other side's as being to emotion, and the argument is allowed to rage on.

It wouldn't be much of an argument if there was no emotion. Debates about facts can mostly be resolved by objective research. It is only when we dispute which facts are important, and what the implications of partial facts might be, that we get into real argument. This requires assessments of values, and extrapolation from partial information, both of which are intrinsically emotional.

Facts are rarely neutral, at least in any kind of public discourse. The weighing of facts, and making judgments about porportionality, is the part that bedevils everybody.

There is debate about whether policy can be based on evidence. This would mean proving that our values are based on facts. Some idealists have argued for this, but realistically, policy values can only be informed by factual evidence, not determined by it. The facts always have to be placed in a moral framework of the values we consider important.

Two opposing policy stances can each be informed by the facts, just not by the facts, in the view of the opposing side. Democracy rears it head here, as there isn't a mandate for unilateral action by the side that has determined the facts and may be able to wield the necessary power.

Value judgments and preferences are intrinsically metaphysical, meaning they cannot be based solely on physical information. All statements of rights and principles ultimately rest on such metaphysical preferences - on moral sentiment, not on facts. This all left the positivist philosopher David Hume in something of a nihilist quandary, as his logical argument that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is' left him with no objectively reliable values. Immanuel Kant claimed to have refuted Hume's so-called naturalistic fallacy by arguing that support for duty is a necessary condition of experience, and so moral law has factual status. Logically, Hume cannot be refuted, but practically we cannot live without such a Kantian synthesis.

I agree. Well said.

RT:
There is a need here to understand the logical distinction between facts and values. Facts are objective statements about the world, while values are expressions of moral sentiment. An argument about facts can be resolved by recourse to evidence, whereas an argument about values relies on moral persuasion. The values of a scientists do influence perceptions about which facts are important and useful, but such values should not influence scientific opinion regarding the truth of those facts.

Well said, RT.

This is precisely why evidence is so necessary. Faith comes down to a he said argument which can never be resolved because it is all opinion and attachment. The facts, however, are sitting right there. They are the impartial third party which can conclusively resolve whose description is more accurate than the other.

I find it hard to articulate the value of facts, yet it seems more and more that it needs to be pointed out to people in general.

RT:
Value judgments and preferences are intrinsically metaphysical, meaning they cannot be based solely on physical information. All statements of rights and principles ultimately rest on such metaphysical preferences - on moral sentiment, not on facts. This all left the positivist philosopher David Hume in something of a nihilist quandary, as his logical argument that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is' left him with no objectively reliable values.

Here's George Carlin on the same subject. Check starting at 4:19, but the whole thing is good.



"Rights" are just an idea. The fact is that you have the right to die in the worst way imaginable. No physical law protects you from this. The fact is that it can happen, and it does to some people. People die starving to death under a blazing sun with scorpions laying eggs in their ears. God didn't save them, Justice didn't save them, and their "god given rights" didn't save them.

What MIGHT have saved them is people caring what happens to other people. Even the people you don't know, and that is a value construct. It is OUR opinion that it is a bad thing to die alone, in the desert, starving to death with scorpions crawling on your face. Nature has no problem with this at all. It is a fact that we have that opinion, but not that our opinion is objectively valid. Value constructs only have meaning to minds, and so it must always be the mind that we seek to safeguard in our moral dealings.

Robert Tulip wrote:

Doulos wrote:The dates I posted are the range within respected scholarship, and yes they are considered very 'conventional'.

But that is the same 'conventional scholarship' that argues without evidence that Jesus Christ was a historical person, and that accepts unscientific miraculous claims. The evidence in terms of early citation and use of the Gospels point to later dates than convention assigns.

Sorry for the delay in replying. Real life has been rather demanding lately

No, conventional means exactly what I posted:
conventional- established by accepted usage or general agreement
(Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition 2009)

While this would probably include most believers, it also includes many who are not. If you choose to use less accepted dating, that's your choice, but please don't try to pass it off as the 'proper' dating.

Robert Tulip wrote:

Doulos wrote: Part of the problem probably lies with your assumption of a 70's date, which is mainly predicated upon a view that prophesy cannot be real, and so any mention of future events must indicate a lie and future authorship. The problem is that this view is begging the question, and assumes something which is then used as its own proof.

It is not just the question of the provenance of the prophecy of the destruction of the temple in 70AD, but also the thinness of any corroboration.

"thinness of any corroboration"
You are making assertions without facts or evidence Robert. If you think it's true, back it up with evidence.

I suggest you post reasons for why you believe in a post 70s date if you think the evidence is strong for that view.

Robert Tulip wrote:

You still assert that there is "absence of definitive early citation," and seem to be ignoring the evidence to the contrary that I posted:
- Ignatius (30-110 AD) quotes Matthew, John, Acts, Romans, I Corinthians, Ephesians, Phillipians, Galatians, Colossians, James, I and II Thessalonians, I and II Timothy, and I Peter.
- 'Epistle of Barnabas' (dated 70-130 AD) cites Matthew, and Mark
- 'Shepherd of Hermas' (dated 80-90 AD) cites John, the synoptic Gospels, Ephesians, 1 Peter, Hebrews, James and the Book of Revelations.

As you will note, these are not citations of "Christian traditions," but rather citations of the "four Gospels as we have them" as well as other books of the NT. Furthermore, all of these are before Irenaeus.

You don't seem to get my point. Yes there were Christian traditions, which probably circulated by spoken word among secret societies. For example the whole Q tradition suggests early collections of sayings. But these traditions were not attributed to the four gospel authors until quite late, and there is a systematic tendency for Christian readers to apply their rose coloured apologist goggles to see things in the text that are simply not there, such as a historical Jesus in Paul.

I am merely addressing the assertion that you made. You said that there was an, "absence of definitive early citation." I have presented definitive early citation. These are not 'traditions,' these are pieces of dated manuscript evidence.

I haven't used any 'rose coloured apologist glasses,' though I may have to get you some if you ignore your own statements and try to reword the argument. What I have used here is simple evidence. If you cannot produce any supporting evidence for your views, might I suggest your views are incorrect.

Robert Tulip wrote: So Doulos, you think it is acceptable to challenge an argument I did not make in order to question one I did? Before Irenaeus, ie until more than a century after they were supposedly written, there was no definitive Gospel text, and we find that the authors you cite have all sorts of ideas that clash with the later historicist orthodoxy, and often quote the text in ways that suggest they are using oral tradition rather than written works. The very late anthologising casts doubt on the date of writing and the authenticity of the Gospels.

I would suggest you deal with the immediate question instead of throwing smoke screens up

You asserted that there was an, "absence of definitive early citation."

In the above post, you also say that "Before Irenaeus, ie until more than a century after they were supposedly written, there was no definitive Gospel text."

Irenaeus (mid 2nd c. AD - 202). All of the following are thus before Irenaeus (and there are more, I've merely chosen a sampling to prove the point).

- Ignatius (30-110 AD) quotes Matthew, John, Acts, Romans, I Corinthians, Ephesians, Phillipians, Galatians, Colossians, James, I and II Thessalonians, I and II Timothy, and I Peter.
- 'Epistle of Barnabas' (dated 70-130 AD) cites Matthew, and Mark
- 'Shepherd of Hermas' (dated 80-90 AD) cites John, the synoptic Gospels, Ephesians, 1 Peter, Hebrews, James and the Book of Revelations.

As noted above, each of these includes gospel and NT letter text. I'm not sure how you can make an assertion when contrary evidence is staring you in the face.

As to your other diversions, we can discuss those once we resolve this first issue.

Robert Tulip wrote:
If documents about the American Civil War were only made public as a collection today, with no clear evidence of their provenance other than hidden oral memory and sketchy mentions by early writers, we would hardly consider them reliable. But the Christian situation is even worse, since the ancient Christians had a clear agenda to distort and invent history.

I would also suggest you not imply that Ehrman is a 'liar for the lord,' as he's made no secret of his own agnosticism.

Claiming to be agnostic is just a trick that Ehrman uses to gain public credibility for his religious agenda. If Ehrman was not a secret believer he would not present the baseless sloppy arguments of Did Jesus Exist? He is driven more by emotion than reason in a classic religious manner.

Is your only evidence baseless innuendo and conspiracy theories???

Geez Robert, get a grip.

Doulos wrote:- 'Epistle of Barnabas' (dated 70-130 AD) cites Matthew, and Mark

Lets just look at this example. The text is at http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/t ... tfoot.html

It does not mention Matthew or Mark, but states at 4.14 "the scripture saith, many are called but few are chosen."

Goggle eyed apologists latch onto this as a "citation", to use Doulos' exaggerated term, from Matthew 22:14. Garbage. It does not mention Matthew and could easily have come from a common source. And yet the Catholic Encyclopedia has the hide to state "It cites, in fact, the Gospel of St. Matthew as Scripture (ch. 4:14)". Like Doulos, the CE is engaged in nothing more than flimsy straw-clutching through Gospel tinted apologist glasses.

My understanding is that all these supposed early references to the Gospels are of similar low quality. Happy to be converted if Doulos can show something better.

Interbane wrote:

I haven't said 'how' is an invalid question, merely that it is:
a) probably not answerable IF God does exist, because by definition 'supernatural' events are departures from what nature normally does
b) not really germane to questions of the existance of God, because even if we identify 'how' this does not address if there was a 'by whom'

Loose language coupled with contingency. "Probably not answerable if..." I agree completely. There are many other modifiers that would likely render the "how" question unanswerable as well. But we need not entertain speculation, because we're already well aware that the "how" question can and does apply to most of our universe. If you're making the claim that there is an exception, the burden is on you to support that claim.

That's one of the reasons I don't view science and Christianity as contrary. Science seeks to explain 'how'... Christianity is answering 'by whom' and 'why.'

There has to be a "whom" for the question to make sense. You're putting the cart before the horse and assuming the precedent. What makes you think there is necessarily an entity that acts as the "whom"?

Note that a Christian could say the same thing, but inverting the position of Atheists and Theists. You would disagree strongly, but would that be because you are correct... or because you are biased?

Would a Christian be able to say the same thing, or are you merely assuming this? I don't make the claim while suspended by my bootstraps. I've been on Booktalk.org for 10 years, and all the conversations are saved. You and anyone else is more than welcome to research these conversations. The bias is evident and blatant from the majority of theists, as you'd agree if you were to read through the dialogues.

When real life is a bit slower for you, take the time to read through the conversations and make a determination yourself. Don't simply take my word for it. Are you aware of the many types of bias, that you might recognize them? Some quick reading on critical thinking(google it) will inform you fairly well of the different types of biases.

I would suggest you are simply more accustomed and accepting of the Atheist argument, so you do not consider it 'biased.'

If that is the case, please point out where my bias is most evident. I ask this quite often, in hopes of a response. If I am "accepting" of the atheist argument(I'm not sure what that means), then it is only because of the supportive reasoning. But i'll remind you again that I'm not entirely accepting of the atheist argument.

By relegating a 'human condition' more heavily towards those who disagree with you, aren't you demonstrating the very bias you claim not to have?

I didn't relegate. A human condition applies to humans. The response to the condition is where the difference lies. Look through the conversations as I suggest, and you'll see hundreds of examples where I point out a person's bias, but am ignored. It's as though the word simply doesn't register with many theists. Or they think of the word according to the dictionary definition, the "layman's" definition.

There are distinct and easily recognizable "cognitive biases" that anyone can become familiar with. If you're hoping to show where I display the same bias, you have a treasure trove of conversations I've participated in. Show me the money. I bet it will be far more difficult than you realize. I am sensitive to my own bias, and quash it like a worm. But like anyone, I'm at times inconsistent, for which I apologize.

I've never suggested that you're not sensitive to your own bias. What I've suggested is that even with that sensitivity, bias still occurs.

Note that the definition of bias that you are using (cognitive bias) is defined in part by a subjective measure... irrationality of conclusions. Whether cognitive bias is perceived is directly related to whether the subject's conclusions are viewed as less rational. Where you lean towards one conclusion yourself, and view the other conclusion as irrational, then yes... of course you will perceive the other viewpoint as much more irrational, and thus cognitively biased. You essentially have a 'begging the question' situation.

I would question why you're using the cognitive bias definition in the first place, especially when the 'layman's' definition is really what people are talking about in regards to this issue.

bias-Prejudice in favor of or against one thing, person, or group compared with another, usually in a way considered to be unfair.
(Oxford)

"The bias is evident and blatant from the majority of theists"
Please note I'm not disagreeing with this statement... merely suggesting that it is just as true for Atheists, but you are simply more in agreement with that bias.

Note also that your experiential sampling seems to based mainly on conversations within this forum (If I'm incorrect on this, please let me know. I can only go by what you post). As I've had pointed out to me, this forum is heavily Atheist leaning, so the Christians you get here are possibly leaning towards a certain 'type' in the first place, which skews any use of them as a representative sampling.

As you say, "I point out a person's bias, but am ignored. It's as though the word simply doesn't register." Funny... what you say about others may apply equally to yourself.

...and no, I do not consider myself to be without bias either.

Robert Tulip wrote:

Doulos wrote:- 'Epistle of Barnabas' (dated 70-130 AD) cites Matthew, and Mark

Lets just look at this example. The text is at http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/t ... tfoot.html

It does not mention Matthew or Mark, but states at 4.14 "the scripture saith, many are called but few are chosen."

Goggle eyed apologists latch onto this as a "citation", to use Doulos' exaggerated term, from Matthew 22:14. Garbage. It does not mention Matthew and could easily have come from a common source. And yet the Catholic Encyclopedia has the hide to state "It cites, in fact, the Gospel of St. Matthew as Scripture (ch. 4:14)". Like Doulos, the CE is engaged in nothing more than flimsy straw-clutching through Gospel tinted apologist glasses.

My understanding is that all these supposed early references to the Gospels are of similar low quality. Happy to be converted if Doulos can show something better.

I'm sorry Robert, but your idea is simply based on anachronistic thinking.

The modern idea of citation simply did not exist in the ancient world. Would you like Barnabas to use APA? Oops, wasn't invented till the early 20th century! Chicago style citation? Oops written in 1906! Turabian style? Oops, same situation as Chicago!

When ancient writers cite a document, they often simply use the words of that source. This IS ancient citation. When we see identical textual passages using specific matching word order, then yes... this is citation.

If you're looking for 20th century citation standards in ancient text...