Is there a good?

[MadArchitect]

Taking this example, the firefighters did/do what they did/do becuase they had a calling to do good. They felt good at the end of the day from performing their deeds and that kept them going. Also...look at how respected and remembered they are to this day. For those that believe in ANYTHING after this life or the value of being remembered, it seems like this indeed had a benefit for them and their familes.

I wouldn't say that achieving a good that is its own end has to be completely without individual benefit. But in order to actually accrue the benefit of feeling good at the end of the day, you have to make it to the end of the day. And I'm not sure that being respected and remembered after death is much of a personal good -- honestly, what good does it do the deceased?

Look at it this way. Let's assume that no personal benefit accrued to the firefighters who died. And while we're at it, let's divorce ourselves from any direct connection we may have to the incident and say that no real good accrues directly to us by virtue of the act. Do we still think that their action was good? Is it good in itself?

There is no one single thing anyone can ever point to...except the one that concerns us right here and now: Our continued existence, together, as a Civilization.

That seems problematic to me. For one thing, we're notoriously inconsistent about who we consider part of civilization. For another, there are plenty of people who believe that it would be better (as in, more good) to have something else -- be there hermits, anarchists, or just plain discontents.

Can YOU point to an ultimate good that is not based on any moral definitions that we have created?

Do you mean, Can I point to a good that isn't our own conception, or Can I point to a good that isn't founded in a prior moral consideration? In the first case, the answer would be no, but then, that's all part of my view of culture and epistemology -- I think we look at the entire world through a set of symbols and ideas of our own creation, and I'm not sure that you can ever break that screen down to the point that you'd be able so see the world as it is apart from human though. In the second case, I'd say it's possible, but to be honest, I'm not entirely sure what that good would be, so I'm not entirely convinced of its existence -- even as a working notion. Hence, this thread.

Genesis is hardly an irrelevant component to the discussion.

I didn't say it was irrelevant. But that it may be relevant is no reason to let it stand in for your own answer. What I asked was, Do you think there's any such thing as a good that is its own end? You answered as though I were asking for a few words on what cultural artifacts have influenced our notions of good.

To begin discussing what we mean by good by engaging one of the primary sources of the meaning of the term seems sensible to me.

I provided a brief but fairly comprehensive explanation of what I meant by good in my opening post. If you don't want to take that for granted, at least for the sake of one tiny little thread, then fine, but you won't really be answering my question.

I don't think any of us (whether we start in Athens or Jerusalem) can escape reliance upon some transcendental source when determining what is good. If we choose to look, we are always going to find a deeper, or higher, stratum of authority to legitimize our moral codes.

Okay, so granting that we are reliant on the idea of a transcendental source, is there any chance of one actually existing?

Your questioning in this thread is an attempt to understand our choices for where we have drawn our lines.

No, I'm pretty sure my questioning in this thread is an attempt to find out whether or not the people posting to BookTalk believe that there is a good outside of what we, as individuals, want.

Again, I don't see how any of us can escape including some kind of heaven in our moral equations.

So, following from that, would you say that atheists and metaphysical naturalists are incapable of morality? Or that, despite their protests, they actually believe in "some kind of heaven", if only to sustain their belief in morality?

I can be good without appealing to any higher power, unless you consider the benefit of the species a higher power...but if that is the case, then we are just in a semantics game again.

Even without making a big semantic production out of it, I'd say that "the good of the species" qualifies as a higher power. When we talk about transcendence and a higher power, what we're talking about, essentially, is whatever trumps individual human existence. And if you conceive of morality as something that could demand of an individual self-sacrafice for the benefit of the species, then you're definitely talking about that sort of trump card.

It's an odd question, once you start to think about: Why should I give a damn about my species? After all, once I'm dead, the survival of the species doesn't mean anything to me in practical terms. And to consider how I would feel if I were still alive at the point seems like an abstraction without much purpose. So why should I do anything that would endanger my own existence if the only thing to recommend it is the survival of the species? Wouldn't it be more logical to premise my morality on maintaining the species for the duration of my lifespan, and then, after that, to hell with 'em?

It looks to me as though a lot of people have taken arguments like those in "The Moral Animal" -- arguments to the effect that our morality is not so much a rational consideration of what might be good, but a genetic inheritence conditioned by evolution -- and construed them as the proper basis for reiterating morality as we've received it. So they say things like, We should be moral because it's good for the species, rather than, We tend to be moral (regardless of whether or not we should be) because the forms of behavior we identify as moral were evolutionarily selected.

[Dissident Heart]

Mr. P: The term good and what we are discussing here far anti-dates the bible. Mad brought up the Greek culture in regard to this. The Bible and Genesis is a baby compared to this. To call the bible a "primary source" regarding this matter is a bit naive.

Obviously I disagree. I recognize the role of Athens in establishing much of the linguistic and intellectual foundation of what me mean by good, and much else besides. I also recognize the role of the Bible. I think the history of western civilization and much of our contemporary landscape supports a (not the )primary role for what I describe as a Biblical legacy. I think it naive to dismiss it as baby .

Me: I don't think any of us (whether we start in Athens or Jerusalem) can escape reliance upon some transcendental source when determining what is good.
Mr. P: Uhm...yes, some of us can and do.

When I say transcendent I refer to something that is not determined by political pressure, economic demands, personal preference, or cultural heritage...in short, something beyond the exigencies of history: it, whatever it may be, is not subject to circumstantial demand or situational concerns. Rather, it sets the parameters and lays the boundaries for what is acceptable and reliable for discourse and behavior.

I fully accept the difficulties that arise when trying to define what it is that carries this sort of transcendent force and power: especially since even the language we use is already a commitment towards some transcendent something. For you, the transcendent is human nature as defined by natural selection: everything else is determined by what you mean by that. Nothing escapes its pull and attraction: everything and everyone are mandated to behave according to its decree. Actually, people can and often do struggle against its command (as you describe as leaning on an antiquated crutch unable to cope with the way things really are. ) No matter the historical setting, personal preference or cultural heritage: all are defined and determined by human nature as produced through natural selection.

Mr. P: I can be good without appealing to any higher power, unless you consider the benefit of the species a higher power...but if that is the case, then we are just in a semantics game again.

I don't think it is merely semantics. I think your idea of the human species and your obligation to protect it reflects something more than mere scientific reasoning. I think it reflects your commitment to a transcendent something that demands a code of behavior from yourself. You are mandated by the species to behave accordingly. Thus, species is your higher power and it is the altar upon which you are willing sacrifice what is most important and valuable to you. Why you decide to draw the line at benefit of the species reflects the extent of command you are willing to submit to.

Mr. P: It is best, IMO, to start & end on what we can hope to understand...ourselves. The other animals just dont seem to care!

If we continue to define self as something apart or isolated from everything else (including the animals) then ourselves may very well be all that we can understand. But I think that delivers an impoverished notion of selfhood, as well as an inaccurate view of how we connect to the earth and beyond. We are all subject to powers and forces pulling the elements of our bodies and brains in multiple directions all the time: where we place limits upon those forces, draw the lines of acceptable behavior ( i.e., our morality) is actually just another force among many.

Where we decide to say, "This is self and this what selves are supposed to do", I argue, is a transcendent claim: rather, it rests upon a transcendent source.

[Dissident Heart]

MA: Okay, so granting that we are reliant on the idea of a transcendental source, is there any chance of one actually existing?

Sure there's a chance. I don't know how to move it from chance to fact, beyond actually trying it out. In other words, does the transcendental mandate deliver upon its promises? For the Atheist, I think it becomes a question of athropodicy, the Theist it is theodicy. Does the transcendent Human Nature deliver the goods, or Ruach Elohim? In other words, we submit to the good that delivers the goods. If it delivers the goods, it actually exists.

That's when the athropo/theodicy element kicks in: does either source really deliver the goods?

Me: Your questioning in this thread is an attempt to understand our choices for where we have drawn our lines.
MA: No, I'm pretty sure my questioning in this thread is an attempt to find out whether or not the people posting to BookTalk believe that there is a good outside of what we, as individuals, want.

Which is, as I see it, a matter of defining where we draw the lines: where our search for a moral foundation finally ceases searching and says "This is where I find the Good".

MA: So, following from that, would you say that atheists and metaphysical naturalists are incapable of morality? Or that, despite their protests, they actually believe in "some kind of heaven", if only to sustain their belief in morality?

The latter. I argue that even the protest relies upon some kind of heaven.

[Dissident Heart]

MA: my questioning in this thread is an attempt to find out whether or not the people posting to BookTalk believe that there is a good outside of what we, as individuals, want.

How much of our wants are really ours, as individuals ? In other words, are our wants individual concerns, or do they gain their force elsewhere? How much is dependent upon our time in the nursery, at grammar school, hanging out with the fellas, digesting mass media, securing a mate, the books we read, the authorities we submit to? Were do we draw the line between individualness and the list of influences I've mentioned here?

I think where we say, "This is "I" and that is "Other" or "Not-I".." is a moral claim. Thus, naming a good beyond ourselves (or any determination thereof) is already a moral claim: we are driven by some moral code to define good as individual or personal. There is no a-moral space from which to make the claim. Defining the good as individual or otherwise requires a prior decision regarding what is good: namely, it is good to determine the source of what we mean by good.

Why is it good to define the good?

[MadArchitect]

I don't know how to move it from chance to fact, beyond actually trying it out.

How would even "trying it out" make it fact? If we assume that there is a transcendent mandate to behave morally, what sort of confirmation could we expect that we have, by behaving in such and such a way, succeeded in achieving the good?

Which is, as I see it, a matter of defining where we draw the lines: where our search for a moral foundation finally ceases searching and says "This is where I find the Good".

Before we even get to that question, I'd like to know whether or not anyone's actually looking for the good. Rather than drawing a line and saying, "This is where I find the good", it seems entirely plausible that some people aren't drawing any line and saying instead, "If there is something called the good, it doesn't pertain to me."

I argue that even the protest relies upon some kind of heaven.

I don't really intend to argue that with you, but I am interested: What's the background to your argument? Why do you suppose that "some kind of heaven" is the background of atheist morality?

How much is dependent upon our time in the nursery, at grammar school, hanging out with the fellas, digesting mass media, securing a mate, the books we read, the authorities we submit to?

Certainly no more than is dependent on our status as wanting agents. If what I want is informed by the social groups I run with, so be it; but I don't see being informed by a group as reason to suppose that my want is any less my own responsibility. After all, how I react to my social environment is a function of my individual character. If nothing else, I am a locus point for all of those influences, and the particular expression those influences take on through me is characteristic of my role as agent.

Your emphasis on the interconnectedness of all things is laudable and warranted in some degree, but at times you dwell on it to the point of marginalizing or ignoring facets of human existence that I think it would be a mistake to part with.

I think where we say, "This is "I" and that is "Other" or "Not-I".." is a moral claim.

I think it's just as much a physical claim, if not morese. If I can think a thing and then will it, and feel fairly confident that my willing actually led to it's happening, then that is I. If I can think about putting this hand in a flame, and in willing it, cause it to actually do so, then it's my hand, isn't it? If I can't will it, then maybe it isn't my hand. That has moral reprecussions, sure, but it does not seem to me an inherently moral claim.

Thus, naming a good beyond ourselves (or any determination thereof) is already a moral claim: we are driven by some moral code to define good as individual or personal.

Where did we get the moral imperative to name a good beyond ourselves? Is it merely natural for humans to do so? If so, then why do some humans seem to lack any feeling for that imperative?

Why is it good to define the good?

Because we want to make sure that we haven't called something good that isn't. Which is to say, that we only seek it if we've already decided it's worth finding. Those who aren't interested in finding it aren't likely to find much use for definitions of it. Which takes us back to a variant form of the original question: Who here thinks there is a good worth finding?

[seeker]

Mr. Pessimist wrote:

Good is what humans define...and it there were no goal to achieving good, why bother?

I agree. There is no absolute Good that exists independenly in reality outside of the human mind. I'm getting confused by the use of the word "goal." Can your question be paraphrased "if there is no reason/motivation to achieve the good, why bother?"

Dissident Heart wrote:

In Genesis, Elohim transforms the dark, formless, watery abyss of Tehom into a voluptuous living Creation in six days; and at the end of it all Elohim decrees it to be good, very good.

Creativity is definitely a source of good feelings. I'm not sure there is any other way to define "Good" except in terms of feelings. However, I think we all could probably agree that not all good feelings are created equal. There are some pleasures that we feel guilty about even as we experience them.

MadArchitect wrote:

Is there some consistent and widespread goal that can be taken as the principle in reference to which we define the good? And if so, why do we persue that goal?

The most widespread goal I can think of is Immortality, but that a personal good. If we were to decide that Immortality should be available to all humans who want it, that would be a social Good. Although we pursue the social Good for personal reasons, perhaps different from person to person, there is plenty of evidence that many people do feel motivated to pursue the social Good, and that it is not always driven by hope of Heaven or fear of Hell.

Mr. Pessimist wrote:

Good is what makes us feel good (or else it would be bad yes?)...whether it is the happy pleasure of trinkets, good food, friendship or the pain that comes with knowing that we did what society defeines as good (and as we ourselves agree with) even though it caused us some pain (the big picture).

I agree with this. I also think that there is a hard-wired "need for approval" that makes us social creatures. Satisfying this need certainly makes us feel good. But are we getting to the point where "feeling good" is too broad a broom. Are the good feelings that come from creativity and the good feelings you get from atta-boys and the good feelings you get from a glass of wine all the same phenomenon or are they different emotions, all of which happen to be positive? Note that we discriminate between anger, hate, and fear, even though they are all negative feelings. Is our lack of discrimination among positive feelings a lingering legacy of our dualistic roots (i. e. worldly

[MadArchitect]

There is no absolute Good that exists independenly in reality outside of the human mind.

Would you clarify something about that belief? Does the specifically human and conceptual nature of that good make it imagination and ultimately disposable, or can a human idea of that sort have its own dignity? Are some human notions of the good preferable to others, or is each person's preference incommensurable?

There are some pleasures that we feel guilty about even as we experience them.

Are associated "bad" feelings the only reason to avoid them? For example, if a person could revenge some perceived mishandling without feeling a sense of guilt or repulsion, would revenge then be an unqualified good for that person? Or is the act good or bad independently of how the person acting feels about it?

Are the good feelings that come from creativity and the good feelings you get from atta-boys and the good feelings you get from a glass of wine all the same phenomenon or are they different emotions, all of which happen to be positive?

For that matter, are they the same as the good feeling some people get from stealing something they want, or from torturing small animals?

Is our lack of discrimination among positive feelings a lingering legacy of our dualistic roots (i. e. worldly

[Dissident Heart]

MA: How would even "trying it out" make it fact? If we assume that there is a transcendent mandate to behave morally, what sort of confirmation could we expect that we have, by behaving in such and such a way, succeeded in achieving the good?

The mandate carries a promise: if you abide, you flourish; if you don't, you decompose. Of course, everything decomposes eventually. Perhaps that's a clue to understanding that morality isn't simply "what's in it for me"...but, instead, what's the right thing to do, no matter what it means to me. If it isn't simply "what's in it for me", but still leads to flourishing- then it means we need to revaluate what we mean by "me". Morality promises flourishing, but it might not include you. It may require a sacrifice: yourself even.

Thus, it seems to me, the transcendent becomes fact when the promise is delivered; and the promise is delivered when we act.

MA: I'd like to know whether or not anyone's actually looking for the good. Rather than drawing a line and saying, "This is where I find the good", it seems entirely plausible that some people aren't drawing any line and saying instead, "If there is something called the good, it doesn't pertain to me."

I see. I suppose I would call the statement, "the good don't matter to me" being yet another line drawn. Actually, I guess my argument is that the good always matters. In essence, what matters is what is good.

MA: Why do you suppose that "some kind of heaven" is the background of atheist morality?

Morality is about what ought, should and must be: it is fueled by a vision of human life that rises above the pull of appetite and desire. It imagines a way of living that reaches beyond the base grip of genitalia and gastric demands. It wants something more than animal.

[MadArchitect]

The mandate carries a promise: if you abide, you flourish; if you don't, you decompose.

I don't know why we should assume that to be so. Who or what makes this promise?

Again, that looks like a redirection of good. We strive to be good in order to flourish, or to make something else flourish? Then good is not the goal, "flourishing" is. By then, why do we want to flourish? Or even more mystifying, if, as you suggest further down, it isn't always ourselves that's made to flourish, why do we want that something else to flourish?

...but, instead, what's the right thing to do, no matter what it means to me.

So there is a good independent of our own particular benefit? I'm having trouble reconciling his sentiment to the rest of what you've said.

If it isn't simply "what's in it for me", but still leads to flourishing- then it means we need to revaluate what we mean by "me".

Why? If we don't assume that doing the moral thing is always to our benefit, then what about the equation makes it necessary to re-evaluate what we mean by "me"? That looks like an attempt to make morality about "my" benefit by stretching the concept of self to encompass whatever else might profit from "my" moral behavior.

Morality is about what ought, should and must be...

I'm not sure what difference is implied between ought and should. And I certainly don't think morality is about what must be. In fact, it seems to me that morality is often about what won't be, at least, not as it should be. If you really need a third term, "could" might serve better. It might also be the most we can aspire to.

It wants something more than animal.

Which, I suppose, takes us back to the original question. And would seem to deny that animals can, as animals, have moral value.

[Dissident Heart]

Me: The mandate carries a promise: if you abide, you flourish; if you don't, you decompose.
MA: I don't know why we should assume that to be so. Who or what makes this promise?

Good question. I'm not exactly sure. I think it has something to do with God. Now, I'm not entirely clear what I mean by God, but it has something to do with what I began with regarding Ruach Elohim in this thread. Somehow, somewhere, there is a call and a promise: a provocation to "do the right thing", which evokes a sting of conscience when avoided, and delivers a hell of a punch when denied. I don't know if Genesis has it entirely correct, but it makes sense to me: we are called to transform lifeless matter into healthy flesh. Why listen to Genesis in this case: what authority does it have in these matters? Hell, what authority does anyone have in these matters?

MA: We strive to be good in order to flourish, or to make something else flourish? Then good is not the goal, "flourishing" is. By then, why do we want to flourish?

Is it descriptive or prescriptive? If you do good, you will flourish; if you don't, you will whither away. I'm leaning more towards descriptive, which means the mandate of the good is not about receiving some sort of reward for proper behavior. It is simply describing the fabric of Creation and what will happen when the good is pursued, or avoided. The good is what transforms lifeless matter into flourishing flesh: it is a creative process that changes things from a degenerative to a generative state. It is the right thing to do because it is what Creation must, should, ought to be.

Now, what is fly in the ointment? Whence the tear in Creation that requires a must/ought/should to repair and fix itself? I think it has something to do with the Tehom in Genesis 1. It is a wily, watery abyss that simply wont conform: it is woven into the very fabric of Creation and seems to be forever dismembering, disconnecting, decomposing what is built, organized and flourishing. It is also part and parcel of who we are. Thus, the need for a mandate.

Perhaps another thread can spell out the theological and anthropological implications from this.

MA: if it isn't always ourselves that's made to flourish, why do we want that something else to flourish?

Strange thing called love , the willingness to sacrifice one's benefit and power for the good of another. I think love is an important element in what fuels the mandate from God...hell, it might be the primary element. It might be the only thing that really keeps us committed to doing the right thing: especially if the right thing means sacrificing my own needs for someone else.

MA: If we don't assume that doing the moral thing is always to our benefit, then what about the equation makes it necessary to re-evaluate what we mean by "me"? That looks like an attempt to make morality about "my" benefit by stretching the concept of self to encompass whatever else might profit from "my" moral behavior.

Good point. There is the me that is deluded into imagining an isolated, independent, and autonomous existence; and there is the me that flourishes as an interdependent force within a voluptuous smorgasbord of inter-related life forms and creative energy. If we think the good is about protecting the former, we are mistaken. What is good is what heals the latter.

MA: I'm not sure what difference is implied between ought and should.

Probably very little. It's a rhetorical flourish that I occasionally abuse: blame it on Tehom I guess.

MA: And I certainly don't think morality is about what must be. In fact, it seems to me that morality is often about what won't be, at least, not as it should be.

Now you are so certain about morality? This is a very interesting point you make. Morality is not about what must be, but what won't be. Can you clarify?

MA: If you really need a third term, "could" might serve better. It might also be the most we can aspire to.

This is very close to what I was stumbling towards in retelling the Ruach Elohim story: the spirit of God evokes, provokes, lures out of us an aspiration to the good. But, it is not an aspiration to fleshless spirit; but a reconnection to fecund Creation.

seeker: What we want is an ethical framework on which to base our decisions that transcends all of these concerns. I think such an ethics has to be an evolutionary one