Part I: Morally Evolved (Pages 1 - 58)

[Interbane]

Back to the waitress. It's such situations that exemplify the complexity and nuanced nature of the modern world. If it were just an opportunity to express empathy, what separates it from every other opportunity? We'd soon be broke, it's not evolutionarily stable(in the generic sense).

I'm not sure that the in-group out-group distinction parallels well with empathy vs reasoning. I think empathy is had in most cases where the moral act is self evident. Reasoning adds layers of complex moral guidelines to that which correlate to the complexity of the societies we live in. A good example here is tipping a waitress. There are initially reasons she benefits from tips, and we are driven to act on those reasons by empathy.

This brings into question nature vs nurture. A self-evident act of moral wrongness may be, for example, stealing. Would a person not brought up to view stealing as wrong also feel empathy towards the person he steals from? I think before empathy has an effect on a person, they must realize the relationship their act has with other people. What appears to us as a self-evident moral act may not be the case.

[Grim]

...it is explained under what valuation, what oppression of valuation, the earliest race of contemplative men had to live: when not feared, they were despised. Contemplation first appeared on earth in disguise, in ambiguous form, with an evil heart and often an anxious head: there is no doubt of that. The inactive, brooding, unwarlike element in the instincts of contemplative men long surrounded them with a profound mistrustfulness: the only way of dispelling it was to arouse a decided fear of oneself. And the ancient Brahmins, for instance, knew how to do this! The earliest philosophers knew how to endow their existence and appearance with a meaning, a basis and background, through which others might come to fear them: more closely considered, they did so from an even more fundamental need, namely, so as to fear and reverence themselves. For they found all the value judgements within them turned against them, they had to fight down every kind of suspicion and resistance against "the philosopher in them."

The ascetic ideal for a long time served the philosopher as a form in which he could appear, as a condition for his existence—he had to play the role, in order to be able to be a philosopher. And he had to believe in what he was doing, in order to play that role. The characteristically detached stance of philosophers, something which denies the world, is hostile to life, has no faith in the senses, and is free of sensuality, which was maintained right up to the most recent times and thus became valued almost as the essence of the philosophical posture—that is, above all, a consequence of the critical conditions under which, in general, philosophy arose and survived. In fact, for the longest time on earth philosophy would not have been at all possible without an ascetic cover and costume, without an ascetic misunderstanding of the self. To put the matter explicitly and vividly: up to the most recent times the ascetic priest has provided the repellent and dark caterpillar form which was the only one in which philosophy could live and creep around. . . . Has that really changed? Is the colourful and dangerous winged creature, that “spirit” which this caterpillar hid within itself, at last really been released and allowed out into the light, thanks to a sunnier, warmer, brighter world? Nowadays do we have sufficient pride, daring, bravery, self-certainty, spiritual will, desire to assume responsibility, and freedom of the will so that from now on “the philosopher” is truly possible on earth? . . .

Just a little something to think about.

[DWill]

I get a little fustrated however in that the scope and topic are narrow and yet de Waal seems to feel that any small allowance granting relationship between man and ape equates to licence for serious moral commentary. I'm having trouble figuring out why his work and the work of primatologists is all that important in the sense of human moral understanding. To say that looking to another species for understanding is efficient seems counterintuitive. But really don't the similarities seem to stop there? We are not really all that similar to apes: we don't live like them, we don't really look like them, we don't interact like them in any other manner than very generally. How much difference is enough to matter because it seems that similarities are all too easy to create - they are seemingly wherever you want to find them really.

I think the question you raise is really, "What is the point of this book?" Is it just to present an interesting point/counterpoint debate, de Waal the biologist against an array of philosophers? Is there any more to be resolved than whether or not Veneer Theory has a basis? If not, I would agree that it's all inside baseball. On another level, we might ask whether studying apes produces scientific learning about the development of morality, but doesn't tell us about where to go from here--in other words, no practical spin-off.

I can think, though, of at least one area of our ethics where such a spin-off is claimed, and that is animal rights and welfare. Most of the writers state that our more intimate knowledge of the similarites beween us and the primates should make us more determined not to mistreat these creatures. Singer, of course would go much farther "down" the scale than to other primates when it comes to recognizing rights.

The biggest payoff, as de Waal implies, of studying the other primates is the window it gives us on our own nature. I agree that our assumptions about our nature have a tremendous importance, especially because we don't recognize what the assumptions are. But why should we need to study another species to be more sure of our nature? I don't know, but it's certain that we can't agree on who we are, never have been able to. Looking at gorillas or chimps, seeing similarities, perhaps the origins of our morality in them, can cement understanding about what we are--that is, it can if we believe that evolution means that apes are wrapped up in us. I guess it's the value of getting distance from ourselves and studying things at a simpler and more controlled level than is possible with our own species.

One example of how primate study should adjust our thinking about ourselves, according to de Waal, is that cognition/reason should be demoted from its status as pilot of our individual selves.

[DWill]

I think before empathy has an effect on a person, they must realize the relationship their act has with other people. What appears to us as a self-evident moral act may not be the case.

I suppose the debate about the primacy of either emotion or reason can be avoided if we just drop the dualism of reason/emotion that is part of Western thought. In a healthily functioning person, reason and emotion work together, in balance. When we say someone is acting irrationally, we are saying the balance is out of whack. For example, laughing at something that clearly shouldn't be funny, expressing excessive fear, or not showing emotion toward a particular event would all be considered indicators of an irrational state during a mental health assessment. It is the same when applied to morality, reason and emotion working in tandem. Not for nothing does the term "emotional intelligence" exist.

[Grim]

Yes, it could be said:

...that we must seek the homeland of justice in the land of the reactive feeling, we must, for love of the truth, rudely turn this around by setting out a different principle: the last territory to be conquered by the spirit of justice is the land of the reactive emotions! If it is truly the case that the just man remains just even towards someone who has injured him (and not just cold, moderate, strange, indifferent: being just is always a positive attitude), if under the sudden attack of personal injury, ridicule, and suspicion, the gaze of the lofty, clear, deep, and benevolent objectivity of the just and judging eye does not grow dark, well, that`s a piece of perfection and the highest mastery on earth, even something that it would be wise for people not to expect and certainly not to believe in too easily.

So where to go from here?

[Interbane]

If he were alive today, Neitzsche would realize there is much wishful thinking in that quote. Some behaviors are reactive due to their survival value, and doing away with them on a species level would required massive gene manipulation of all our unborn young. It is an unattainable ideal currently, but that may change.

[Grim]

Well...since behavior is not really determined at a genetic level (I suppose that you could argue that the potential is). I guess you are right that it would require a lot of manipulation! Neitzsche was familiar with Darwin's theories, I don't know if I would be so bold as to personally challenge Neitzsche's understanding...but you are not me.

More often than most great writers, Nietzsche has been seen in the perspective of his relation to some specific man or movement: at one time it was evolutionism; at another, Nazism; and, after the defeat of Hitler, existentialism. But no one approach of this kind is at all adequate to bring out that experience of the world on which Nietzsche's philosophy was based. To that end, it would be more fruitful to juxtapose Nietzsche with a great poet - and this will be done in the next two chapters. The danger of that approach is that it may be too aesthetic and may fail to do justice to the bite of Nietzsche's thought. Before we develop Nietzsche's continuity with a great tradition, we ought to ask ourselves in what way he revolutionized thought. And if a single field must be chosen to give at least some idea of the break that Nietzsche brought about, ethics is the best choice. Indirectly, this discussion should also illuminate his relation to the Nazis and the existentialists.

Nietzsche's ideas about ethics are far less well known than some of his striking coinages: immoralist, overman, master morality, slave morality, beyond good and evil, will to power, revaluation of all values, and philosophizing with a hammer. These are indeed among his key conceptions, but they can be understood correctly only in context. This is true of philosophic terms generally: Plato's ideas or forms, Spinoza's God, Berkeley's ideas, and Kant's intuition all do not mean what they would mean in a nonphilosophic context; but scarcely any body supposes that they do. In Nietzsche's case, however, this mistake is a commonplace – surely because few other philosophers, if any, have equaled the brilliance and suggestiveness of his formulations. His phrases, once heard, are never forgotten; they stand up by themselves, without requiring the support of any context; and so they have come to live independently of their sire's intentions.

Just some more things to think about. Nothing really realted to the topic.

[Interbane]

Behavior may not be determined at the genetic level, but it could certainly be altered by changing genes! I'm not challenging Neitzcshe's understanding, I'm saying he didn't have access to what we know of evolution. Mostly the past few decades, long after both he and Darwin.

[Robert Tulip]

debate about the primacy of either emotion or reason can be avoided if we just drop the dualism of reason/emotion that is part of Western thought. In a healthily functioning person, reason and emotion work together, in balance. When we say someone is acting irrationally, we are saying the balance is out of whack. For example, laughing at something that clearly shouldn't be funny, expressing excessive fear, or not showing emotion toward a particular event would all be considered indicators of an irrational state during a mental health assessment. It is the same when applied to morality, reason and emotion working in tandem. Not for nothing does the term "emotional intelligence" exist.

De Waal comments favourably on David Hume's argument that reason is the slave of the passions. A source on Hume is http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/

I disagree with Hume and de Waal. Reason is a higher faculty than passion, enabling disinterested and impartial judgement. You cannot fold morality into emotion. Instinctive drives may deliver a result in harmony with our genetic inheritance, but the question whether this result is moral and ethical is a higher rational one, looking at evidence and consequences. Otherwise, with the utilitarian idea that pleasure is the mark of the good, you get the nihilist line which derived partly from Hume - if it feels good, do it. We have passions which restrict carnality as well as support it, so Hume's argument is plausible. However, Hume failed to see how Kant made a correct philosophical argument with his categorical imperative to duty. Duty is a concept of reason which is not derivable from emotion alone, although emotions such as loyalty and empathy contribute to duty. Duty addresses codes of law which have a deep presence in human life, and which have built by precedent to form a foundation for public morality. An aim of law is to implement high moral ideals of justice, not simply to reflect human passions. Hence just law is deontological (based on duty) rather than utilitarian (based on passion).

Overall, emotion is necessary but not sufficient for morality and ethics. We need a higher rational faculty, which is where human language is a major evolutionary step over the limited communication methods available to apes. Human moral DNA is from the apes, but advances above their level through the impartial rationality of moral duty and law.

[DWill]

Conceptualizing the relationship between reason and emotion/feeling as one of higher vs. lower might be a scheme allowing us to impose structure, but still I think that modern neuroscience has the most to offer in the debate. From the little I know, from Damasio mainly, neuroscience can't find evidence of what we like to picture: reason as a control center in the brain. The reality is not so tidy and is not hierarchical. Philosophy needs to give way to neuroscience to some degree.

There is also a distinction between the concepts that thinkers articulate about morality and the everyday actions and interactions that we all have: morality in practice.